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Abstract
In this paper we provide an overview of Tullock’s work on rent-seeking in the
area of economics education. After summarizing the basic rent-seeking model
in both a domestic and international context, we conduct an analysis of un-
dergraduate and graduate texts in public economics. We find a majority of
undergraduate texts cover rent-seeking in depth, but two texts provide zero
coverage. No graduate textbook surveyed mentions rent-seeking. We conclude
by summarizing the economic education literature on rent-seeking, which can
be divided into either classroom experiments or popular culture examples.
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1 Introduction
In the 50 years since the publication of Tullock’s (1967) seminal article, it has been
cited thousands of times (Mueller, 2016). As evidenced by citations, the influence
of his work has extended into nearly all fields of economics and beyond (Durden
et al., 1991). In this paper we attempt to catalog and assess how Tullock’s work on
rent-seeking has been incorporated into undergraduate and graduate textbooks. In
addition, we summarize the literature on economic education that focuses on rent-
seeking so that teachers interested in incorporating this literature into their classrooms
can do so.
Thus, this paper focuses is on the existence and treatment of rent-seeking in
graduate and undergraduate public economics textbooks. The relative importance
given to the subject, however, is dependent on the instructor. Nevertheless, the
introduction of rent-seeking in textbooks is a first step to introducing the human
behavior into the public economics discussion. In short, both the act of interest
groups and the political process will generate inefficiency and lost welfare due to
investments in rent-seeking.
What we do not do in this paper, however, is make the case for why rent-seeking
should be included in textbooks and public economics classes. Perhaps, as scholars
exposed to public choice at formative stages of our careers, this seems self-evident to
us and does not need to be articulated. For those reading this paper who are not of
the public choice school, however, it is important to briefly reflect on why rent-seeking
should be well-represented in all textbooks, not just public sector textbooks.1 We
can think of at least three reasons why students should be taught rent-seeking and
its importance to the world around us. First, a large part of what economists do,
especially in public economics courses, is focus on social inefficiency. Rent-seeking is
1We are heavily indebted to an insightful referee for the motivation and insights contained in this
paragraph.
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clearly socially inefficient. Second, rent-seeking – in the broadest sense – is a perva-
sive feature of humanity. Demonstrating rent-seeking’s pervasiveness can provide for
students a more accurate and complete understanding of human motivation across
different institutional settings. Finally, the discussion of rent-seeking and its im-
portance highlights for students how economies became distorted away from a “free
market economy.”
We proceed in the following manner. Section 2 discusses Tullock’s (1967) and
Krueger’s (1974) seminal papers on rent-seeking. We briefly sketch these models
for two reasons. First, some readers might prefer to have a self-contained article to
hand to a student or colleague teaching public economics for the first time. Second,
Mueller (2016) notes that Krueger (1974) has more citations than Tullock’s (1967)
and therefore textbook discussions might cite her or follow her approach but not his.
Section 3 and 4 present how rent-seeking is treated (or not) in undergraduate and
graduate public economics textbooks, respectively. Section 5 reviews the economic
education literature on rent-seeking, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Rent Seeking Model
The two seminal papers on rent-seeking are Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974). Com-
bined these papers have over 8,000 citations (Mueller, 2016). While Tullock (1967)
introduces the rent-seeking problem by discussing monopolies and tariffs, Krueger
(1974) applies this concept in an international trade framework. Each author fol-
lowed a different path to explain the emergence of rent-seeking and its consequences.
Tullock (1967) uses a simple graphical approach while Krueger (1974) develops a for-
mal model and present some comparative statics. In this section we summarize both
presentations of the rent-seeking problem and the implication raised by both authors.
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2.1 Tullock’s Graphical Model
Tullock (1967) discusses three problems in which rent-seeking behavior is likely to
arise: tariffs, monopoly and theft. At first these three problems may seem unrelated,
however they are connected through some underlying mechanisms: transfers, and
inefficiency.
At first, tariffs, monopoly, and theft create transfers from one group to another
group. For instance, tariffs would create a transfer from international to domestic
producers; a monopoly would create transfers from consumers to producers; and
theft from the robbed to the burglars. If the transfers were to be the only concern,
in terms of social welfare this would not be a problem, as the overall social welfare
would remain the same, however, this is not the case.
The biggest concern is the inefficiency. The three problems Tullock (1967) dis-
cusses will result in an inefficient use of resources which sums up to a substantial loss
to welfare. As argued by the author, governments will not enact tariffs on their own,
but instead they will do so given the pressure (or lobbying) from domestic producers.
Similarly, a non-natural monopoly will be created only if firms invest in acquiring
this “privilege”. On the other hand, people who do not want to get robbed, would
have to spend productive time defending their property rather than producing. These
investments in the attempt of acquiring “privilege” or “protection”, in other words,
the rent-seeking activities, are the biggest loss to society. Tullock (1967) points out
that these activities are hard to identify and measure.
Tullock (1980) lays out rent-seeking as a game problem and provides evidence
of what would be the efficient level of rent-seeking and how much would be lost in
rent-seeking investment. This paper, although not pointed out by Tullock (2003) as
crucial in the development of the rent-seeking concept, has been widely used in rent-
seeking experiments (Dechenaux et al., 2015). A simple algorithm is used to calculate
individual and total investments. We reproduce these equations below
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PA = R
N − 1
N2
(1)
PA = R
b
b + 1
(2)
where PA is the equilibrium investment, R is the determinant of the steepness of the
supply curve (or exponent), N is the number of players, and b is the bias weight.
Sherementa (2015) provides a more intuitive approach to this model such that
PA can be understood as the agent’s effort to get the rent and R is the rent’s prize.
As noted by both authors, the effort is increasing in the value of the prize (R) and
decreasing in the number of players (n), which is the so-called “discouragement effect”.
The intuition behind the bias weight is the differentiation of players instead of purely
restricting their participation in the rent-seeking activity.
2.2 Krueger’s Model
Although Tullock (1967) was published seven years earlier than Krueger (1974), the
latter does not cite Tullock’s work. Tullock (2003) discusses the development of the
idea of rent-seeking and why it was easy for others to miss his 1967 paper until
Krueger’s (1974) paper was published. It was Krueger (1974) who introduced the
term rent-seeking to the literature and is on the list of the twenty most influential
AER papers of the first one hundred years of the journal (Arrow et al., 2011).2
One key difference between Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974) is that the former
2In discussing the importance of Krueger’s work, Arrow et al. (2011) note how influential her
work has been in the field of development economics. While not a focus of our paper, we did survey
all undergraduate and graduate economic development textbooks to see whether rent-seeking was
covered and how extensively. Every economic development textbook discussed rent-seeking and its
importance, usually in relation to corruption. Most, but not all texts, cite Krueger’s seminal article,
but no economic development textbooks mention Tullock. Our reading of the economic development
texts suggests that rent-seeking is seen as much more important in economic development than
public economics. We hope to explore the difference between the coverage of rent-seeking in public
economics and economic development in a future paper, and we are grateful to an anonymous referee
for suggesting this avenue of research.
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relies on a graphical approach with intuitive arguments, while the latter develops a
simple mathematical model to show the rent-seeking problem. One commonality in
the papers is the discussion of tariffs as a rent-seeking issue. However, while Tullock’s
work describes the problem in a developed society, Krueger focuses on developing
economies, which is likely why it has subsequently contributed to a large literature
on corruption and governance in development. Below we discuss the main features
of Krueger’s (1974) model, and leave for the interested reader to refer to the original
paper for more detail.
The model set-up is a basic one. The economy produces only agricultural goods
which are exported, while it imports consumption goods. The only input used is
labor. Thus
A = A(LA) A
′ > 0, A′′ < 0 (3)
where A is output and LA is the labor employed in agriculture. The demand for
imports (M) depends on the price (pM) and income that is created by the level of
output (A)
M = M(pM , A) MpM < 0,MA > 0 (4)
The food consumption (F) is what is not exported (D), such that by definition
D = M . Hence,
F = A−M (5)
Lastly, the labor force supply is fixed and composed by labor in agriculture (LA),
labor in distribution (LD ≡ kD) and labor in rent-seeking (LR):
L¯ = LA + LD + LR (6)
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Under free trade the following occur: LR ≡ 0 and A′ = pDk . However, once import
restrictions with competitive rent-seeking occur, we have A′ = pDM
LD+LR
. One implica-
tion of the introduction of rent-seeking is change in food consumption. Equation (7)
refers to the free trade scenario and equation (8) to the rent-seeking one.
−dF = dM(kA′ + 1) > 1 (7)
dF = dA = −A′LR < 0 (8)
Lastly, Krueger (1974) shows the total value of rents, R:
R =
pDM¯LR
LD + LR
(9)
Overall, although Tullock (1967, 1980) and Krueger (1974) show the rent-seeking
problem using different tools, the conclusion is the same: the loss to welfare from
rent-seeking is not only those of inefficiency. Rather, there is a larger loss resulting
from the investment in lobbying to acquire the rent.
3 Rent-seeking in Undergraduate Public Textbooks
To assess the treatment of rent-seeking at the undergraduate level, we reviewed 6
prominent public economics textbooks aimed at the undergraduate market. The six
textbooks are Rosen and Gayer (2013), Holcombe (2006), Hindriks and Myles (2006),
Ulbrich (2013), Gruber (2016), and Hillman (2009). These textbooks were selected
because they are among the most widely used and representative of undergraduate
public economics textbooks.3
Coverage of rent-seeking is considered along two dimensions. First, we look at
3Calcagno (2015) provides an broad discussion of public finance textbooks and the extent to
which they cover material at the core of public choice.
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prominence within the textbook. For example, does rent-seeking have a separate
chapter? Second, we analyze the extent to which it is covered. Textbooks empha-
sizing rent-seeking will include a separate chapter or section on rent-seeking, contain
rent-seeking in the glossary and table of contents, and include greater page coverage.
Although two textbooks may be similar in their emphasis of rent-seeking, they may
differ in how rent-seeking is covered. Thus, we also consider whether each textbook
contains a mathematical, graphical, or definitional treatment. Additionally, we assess
whether each textbook includes an example of rent-seeking and whether Tullock or
Krueger is cited, reflecting whether the coverage includes references to the original
literature. Lastly, we consider the extent to which each textbook highlights the im-
portance of rent-seeking in society4. Table 1 contains information on the textbooks
surveyed, authors, and coverage of rent-seeking.
As shown in Table 1, the majority of undergraduate public economics textbooks
surveyed include rent-seeking. Although there are differences in both prominence and
method of coverage among textbooks, a few common patterns emerge. Across text-
books, the definition for rent-seeking generally highlights its inefficiency. Resources
are used unproductively rather than productively. One difference across definitions
is whether rent-seeking is applied specifically to rents created by governments. For
example, Rosen and Gayer (2013) define rent-seeking as “using the government to
obtain higher than normal returns” (p. 123). Hillman (2009) also emphasizes gov-
ernments in the definition of rent-seeking. Rents are private benefits that would not
be generated through a market process but instead require government intervention.
However, Hindriks and Myles (2006) focus on inefficiency rather than government
intervention. They define rent-seeking as the “expenditure of resources to create a
profitable opportunity that is ultimately damaging to society” (p. 337). In the discus-
sion surrounding their definition, the emphasis is on the inefficiency of rent-seeking
4We are thankful for a helpful referee comment in pointing out this importance aspect of how
rent-seeking it covered
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and operating inside the production possibilities frontier.
Table 1: Treatment of Rent Seeking in Undergraduate Textbooks
Book Rosen& Gayer Holcombe
Hindricks
& Myles Ulbrich Hillman Gruber
Separate Chapter x x y x x x
Separate Section y y NA x x x
Index y y y x y x
Table of Contents y y y x x x
Page Coverage 3 4 32 0 17 0
Mathematical Treatment x x y x y x
Graphical Treatment y y y x y x
Verbal Treatment
(definition given) y y y x y x
Tullock Referenced x y y x y x
Krueger Referenced x y y x x x
Example Given y y y x y x
Importance Emphasized y x y x y x
Notes: Editions of surveyed texts are: Rosen and Gayer (2013), Holcombe (2006), Hindriks and
Myles (2006), Ulbrich (2013), Hillman (2009), and Gruber (2016). y denotes “yes” and x denotes
“no”.
All textbooks including rent-seeking give a real-world example. A wide variety
of examples exist across textbooks. Holcombe (2006) highlights professional orga-
nizations securing government regulations to restrict competition. Barbers, medical
doctors, and real estate agents secure rents through government-imposed barriers
to entry. Highlighting tariffs, Hindriks and Myles (2006) provide an example of a
firm hiring lawyers to prevent imports from foreign competitors. Emphasizing the
transfer nature of rent-seeking, Hillman (2009) gives the example of a productive and
unproductive farmer. While the productive farmer engages in profit seeking, the un-
productive farmer can engage in rent-seeking by lobbying the government to receive
the property rights of the productive farmer.
Rosen and Gayer (2013) also emphasize farming by weaving the example of peanut
farmers into their entire treatment of rent-seeking. Government licenses granted to
peanut farmers is used in their graphical treatment, as an example immediately fol-
lowing the definition of rent-seeking, and as a way of understanding why rent-seeking
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continues to exist despite being socially inefficient. Peanut farmers expend resources
to maintain a system of licenses to restrict peanut supply leading to monopoly pric-
ing. This process leads not only to the deadweight loss of fewer mutually beneficial
peanut trades but also the deadweight loss of rent-seeking. However, Rosen and Gayer
(2013) explain that despite the social inefficiency rent-seeking remains because the
benefits are concentrated among a few peanut farmers while the costs are dispersed
across society. Every undergraduate text including rent-seeking provides an example,
as these examples seem to be a natural way of solidifying student understanding of
the definition of rent-seeking and a way to motivate the graphical treatment.
These examples may also be a substitute for more rigorous discussion of rent-
seeking models. For while examples of rent-seeking are common in undergraduate
texts, mathematical treatments of rent-seeking are not. Only the advanced under-
graduate texts of Hillman (2009) and Hindriks and Myles (2006) include math. Hill-
man (2009) starts with a Tullock contest function and ends with a demonstration of
how rent dissipation varies with the number of players. Hindriks and Myles (2006)
build the model by considering a prize to be won between two competitors. They
explore when there will be complete and partial rent dissipation and how the results
change with free-entry and risk aversion.
The ease of a graphical illustration may be a reason for why undergraduate texts
are unlikely to include a mathematical treatment of rent-seeking. Each undergraduate
text surveyed that includes rent-seeking also includes a graphical treatment. The
graphical treatment builds upon an illustration that students are already familiar
with- the deadweight loss of monopoly. In a straightforward way, the texts are able to
show that the full deadweight loss to society includes not only the Harberger triangle
but also the area containing monopoly profits. The most substantive treatment of the
true deadweight loss is given in Hindriks and Myles (2006) as they include a discussion
of real-world estimates. They not only mention that overall welfare loss from rent-
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seeking is between 4 and 13 percent of gross corporate product but also provide an
example from the US Federal Communications Commission. In their allocation of
643 regional cell phone licenses, there were approximately 320,000 contestants with
the total costs from all applications around $400 million.
A majority of undergraduate textbooks covering rent-seeking do include a dis-
cussion of its importance, although in unique ways. Hillman (2009) reflects broadly,
considering how rent-seeking can pervade a society’s culture. Hindriks and Myles
(2006) cite empirical estimates for the social cost of rent-seeking. Additionally, they
highlight the prevalence of lobbyists and how at least 40,000 people in the United
States are employed in positions that contribute no net value to society. Similar to
Hindriks and Myles (2006), Rosen and Gayer (2013) also emphasize lobbying when
considering the importance of rent-seeking. Although lobbyists bring no value to
society, their salaries are often over a million dollars. The only undergraduate text-
book including rent-seeking but lacking a discussion of its importance is Holcombe
(2006). One explanation for the lack of coverage is that Holcombe (2006) appears to
be written so as to be timeless. With no current empirical estimates, Holcombe (2006)
naturally does not include a discussion of its importance. There are many ways that
a topic can be considered important, and the undergraduate textbooks that consider
rent-seeking generally include a unique discussion of why rent-seeking matters for a
society.
While rent-seeking has permeated most undergraduate textbooks, the concept is
not covered at all in Ulbrich (2013) and Gruber (2016). Both textbooks are public
finance texts, not public economics books, which might explain part of the lack of
coverage of rent-seeking. Both texts, however, are about the practice of public finance,
and thus ultimately are about improving public sector outcomes. An understanding
of rent-seeking and how it affects efficiency would seem to be at the core of improving
public policy and thus the exclusion of rent-seeking is problematic.
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4 Rent-Seeking in Graduate Public Textbooks
We surveyed the six most prominent graduate textbooks in the field of public eco-
nomics. The six textbooks are: Laffont (1988), Myles (1995), Kaplow (2011), Salanie
(2011), Tresch (2015), and Atkinson and Stiglitz (2015). While rent-seeking is well-
represented among the undergraduate texts surveyed, we found zero coverage of rent-
seeking in graduate public economics textbooks. Instead of identifying the different
ways that rent-seeking is covered in graduate textbooks, this section instead explores
possible reasons for why graduate textbooks do not discuss rent-seeking at all.
One possibility is that the rent-seeking model is not amenable to theoretical work.
However, this is an unlikely explanation because there is a voluminous literature
on theoretical models of rent-seeking with multiple areas of extension. A few early
extensions include risk averse rent-seekers (Hillman and Katz, 1984), uncertain rents
(Jadlow, 1985), non-identical sharing rules (Nitzan, 1991), and rent-seeking for pure
public goods (Katz et al., 1990). New theoretical rent-seeking papers are continuing to
be published, such as new variants of incomplete information in rent-seeking contests
(Wasser, 2013) and optimal taxation (Rothschild and Scheuer, 2016). Rent seeking
models have and continue to be applied across a wide range of settings, suggesting
that the reason for a lack of rent-seeking in graduate textbooks is not due to a lack
of theoretical work related to rent-seeking.
While the theoretical literature on rent-seeking is large, empirical studies of rent-
seeking are less common as measuring rent-seeking is difficult. Thus, a lack of empiri-
cal work could explain why rent-seeking is not included in graduate texts. Despite the
empirical difficulties, as surveyed in Del Rosal (2011), there are dozens of empirical
rent-seeking studies. However, the measures of rent-seeking employed are defined in
ad hoc and arguably imperfect ways. One common way, as in Laband and Sophocleus
(1988), is to proxy for rent-seeking by the number of lawyers in a country as lawyers
are key players in rent-seeking markets. A novel approach by Sobel and Garrett
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(2002) is to define rent-seeking as having an excess proportion of business activity
related to rent-seeking across capital cities in the United States. Empirical evidence
for rent-seeking remains scant and relies upon imperfect measures of rent-seeking.
To the extent that graduate textbooks focus on core models with clear empirical
applications, rent-seeking models are unlikely to be included.
The lack of rent-seeking coverage in graduate public textbooks might overstate the
extent to which Tullock (1967) is not covered in graduate public economics courses.
Most doctoral courses are paper driven, not book driven. Graduate syllabi typically
include links to seminal articles that are covered in class, while graduate public text-
books seem to be primarily used as reference documents or in masters level courses.5
5 Rent Seeking and Economic Education
The instructor desiring to expose her students to the concept of rent-seeking has a
number of options depending on the course and preparation of the students. One
of the current authors, for example, would have his intermediate microeconomics
students read Tullock (1967) during the section of the course on monopoly. Principles
instructors, of course, are free to utilize the textbooks and examples described in
Section 3. Or they can develop their own classroom example that would be of interest
to students, such as the textbook market, as illustrated by Pecorino (2006). Our view,
following Herbert Spencer, is that it takes varied iterations to get concepts to stick
with students. For those looking for multiple and varied examples that allow for both
repetition of concepts but variety, there exist a number of papers and materials in the
economic education literature to assist. This literature can be broken down into two
types: classroom experiments and media/popular culture. We briefly discuss each in
5At the urging of an insightful referee, we looked at the course offerings and publicly available
syllabi for top programs in economics. Given the nature of academic placements, graduates of these
programs will likely be those teaching future faculty. We could find no evidence of rent-seeking being
explicitly covered in graduate public courses, at least among top 20 schools in economics.
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turn.
5.1 Classroom Experiments
The rise of experimental economics as a field in economics has led to a rise in use
of experiments as a teaching tool. Holt (1999) provides a good introduction to the
history of experiments in the classroom and issues related to conducting them. Goeree
and Holt (1999) describes a simple classroom exercise that illustrates rent-seeking
and the dissipation of rents. They urge instructors to put the exercise into a specific
economic context, so as to help students with understanding and facilitate discussion.
The context used in Goeree and Holt (1999) is the auctioning off of regional cellular
telephone licenses by the US Federal Communications Commission, although their
instructions can be adapted to a variety of other contexts.
The game described by Goeree and Holt (1999) involves four variations of an
auction of a telephone license worth $16,000. The license is awarded by lottery. The
class is divided into four groups, each endowed with $100,000. Each team can purchase
an opportunity to win the telephone license for $3,000. Up to thirteen opportunities
can be purchased a round and the described game lasts three rounds. While students
are initially focused on which team earned the most, post-game discussion is easily
channeled towards the concept of rent dissipation. If more than five $3,000 “lottery”
tickets are purchased in total by the four teams in a round then the total value of
the rent is dissipated. Goeree and Holt (1999) includes three variations on the game
that illustrate different aspects of the problem, such as decreasing the amount of each
“ticket” to $1,000, which tends to encourage more rent-seeking attempts.
The Goeree and Holt (1999) game is straightforward and, given the team nature
of the exercise, can easily be adapted to classrooms of different sizes. Individuals
not desiring to spend an entire class on the game can just do one round, while the
different variants allow the exercise to be extended in a way that provides ample
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information for subsequent discussion and reflection by students on the incentives
facing individuals in a rent-seeking game.6 Bischoff and Hofmann (2002) and Strow
and Strow (2006) provide additional modification and variations on Goeree and Holt
(1999). In particular, new instructors will find the preparation information in Strow
and Strow (2006) to be very helpful.
5.2 Media and Popular Culture
In the last decade economics education journals have been filled with examples of
how to teach economics using examples from popular culture such as television (Al-
Bahrani et al., 2016). Many of these papers provide examples of rent-seeking in the
context of specific movies and television shows. Probably the best example is Mateer
and Stephenson (2011). In this article they provide examples (with specific timing)
from five movies that can be used to illustrate rent-seeking in different contexts. For
example, a scene suggested from 1992’s The Distinguished Gentlemen shows lobbyists
expending resources on sponsoring a fundraising event for the fictional Rep. Johnson
(Eddie Murphy). Mateer and Stephenson (2015) expand on this list with two more
examples, including one from the Academy Award nominated film Dallas Buyers Club.
Podemska-Mikluch et al. (2016) discuss rent-seeking using examples from Harry
Potter. Gillis and Hall (2010) provides an example from The Simpsons regarding
market power and rent-seeking to keep a monopoly that would fit in well with a
discussion of Tullock’s (1967) paper and why he wrote it. More The Simpsons ex-
amples that can be used to illustrate rent-seeking can be found in Considine (2006)
and Hall (2014). Not unsurprisingly, the television show Parks and Recreation, which
focuses on the parks department of a small Indiana town, provides multiple examples
of rent-seeking as detailed by Conaway and Clark (2015).
6Shughart (2015) provides an excellent discussion of conducting a one round all-pay auction in
his masters-level public choice class.
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6 Conclusion
With two exceptions, in the fifty years since the publication of Tullock (1967), rent-
seeking has become standard in undergraduate public economics textbooks. Fike and
Gwartney (2015) show that is also true for principles textbooks, with rent-seeking
covered in nearly all major principles textbooks except for a couple of outliers.7 As the
expansive title of Tullock’s (1967) article suggest, rent-seeking is pervasive, although
difficult to quantify in many situations. For that reason, much like narratives about
how individuals in markets help move the market to a new equilibrium as the result
of their actions, economists writing in the area of economic education have turned to
experiments and examples drawn from popular culture to help illustrate rent-seeking
in action.
References
Al-Bahrani, A., Holder, K., Patel, D., and Sheridan, B. J. (2016). The great digi-
tal divide: Using popular media to teach economics. Journal of Economics and
Economic Education Research, 17(2):105.
Arrow, K., Bernheim, B. D., Feldstein, M. S., McFadden, D., Poterba, J., and Solow,
R. (2011). 100 years of the american economic review: The top 20 articles. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 101(1):1–8.
Atkinson, A. B. and Stiglitz, J. E. (2015). Lectures on Public Economics. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Bischoff, I. and Hofmann, K. (2002). Classroom game on the theory of rent seeking:
Some practical experience. Southern Economic Journal, 69(1):195–199.
Calcagno, P. T. (2015). Teaching public choice economics in a public finance course.
Journal of Economics and Finance Education, 14(2):23–33.
7An insightful referee asked us if any of the introductory textbooks mentioned rent-seeking when
talking about monopolies or tariffs. While we did not have access to the full texts the intro textbooks
discussed in Fike and Gwartney (2015), we read the treatment of monopoly and tariffs for the
textbooks of Gwartney et al. (2018), Krugman and Wells (2012), Mankiw (2014), and Hubbbard
and O’Brien (2017). With the exception of Gwartney et al. (2018), none of these texts discuss
rent-seeking when talking about monopolies or tariffs. Gwartney et al. (2018) mentions rent-seeking
expenditures possibly exceeding monopoly profit.
16
Conaway, L. B. and Clark, C. (2015). Swansonomics: Using Parks and Recreation to
teach economics. Journal of Economics and Finance Education, 14(1):41–68.
Considine, J. (2006). The simpsons: Public choice in the tradition of Swift and Orwell.
The Journal of Economic Education, 37(2):217–228.
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., and Sheremeta, R. M. (2015). A survey of experimental
research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics,
18(4):609–669.
Del Rosal, I. (2011). The empirical measurement of rent-seeking costs. Journal of
Economic Surveys, 25(2):298–325.
Durden, G. C., Ellis, L. V., and Millsaps, S. W. (1991). Gordon Tullock: His journal
and his scholarship. Public Choice, 71(3):171–196.
Fike, R. and Gwartney, J. (2015). Public choice, market failure, and government
failure in principles textbooks. Journal of Economic Education, 46(2):207–218.
Gillis, M. T. and Hall, J. (2010). Using The Simpsons to improve economic instruction
through policy analysis. The American Economist, 55(1):84–92.
Goeree, J. K. and Holt, C. A. (1999). Classroom games: Rent-seeking and the ineffi-
ciency of non-market allocations. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(3):217–226.
Gruber, J. (2016). Public Finance and Public Policy. Macmillan, New York, 5 edition.
Gwartney, J. D., Stroup, R. L., Sobel, R. S., and Macpherson, D. A. (2018). Eco-
nomics: Private and Public Choice. Cengage Learning, Boston.
Hall, J. (2014). Homer Economicus: The Simpsons and Economics. Stanford Uni-
versity Press, Palo Alto, CA.
Hillman, A. L. (2009). Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limi-
tations of Government. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2 edition.
Hillman, A. L. and Katz, E. (1984). Risk-averse rent seekers and the social cost of
monopoly power. Economic Journal, 94(373):104–110.
Hindriks, J. and Myles, G. D. (2006). Intermediate Public Economics. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Holcombe, R. G. (2006). Public Sector Economics: The Role of Government in the
American Economy. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.
Holt, C. A. (1999). Teaching economics with classroom experiments: A symposium.
Southern Economic Journal, 65(3):603–610.
Hubbbard, R. G. and O’Brien, A. P. (2017). Microeconomics. Pearson, Boston.
17
Jadlow, J. (1985). Monopoly rent seeking under conditions of uncertainty. Public
Choice, 45(1):73–87.
Kaplow, L. (2011). The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, NJ.
Katz, E., Nitzan, S., and Rosenberg, J. (1990). Rent-seeking for pure public goods.
Public Choice, 65(1):49–60.
Krueger, A. O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American
Economic Review, 64(3):291–303.
Krugman, P. and Wells, R. (2012). Microeconomics.
Laband, D. N. and Sophocleus, J. P. (1988). The social cost of rent-seeking: First
estimates. Public Choice, 58(3):269–275.
Laffont, J.-J. (1988). Fundamentals of Public Economics. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Mankiw, N. G. (2014). Principles of microeconomics. Cengage Learning, Boston.
Mateer, G. D. and Stephenson, E. F. (2011). Using film clips to teach public choice
economics. Journal of Economics and Finance Education, 10(1):28–36.
Mateer, G. D. and Stephenson, E. F. (2015). Using film clips to teach public choice
economics: Take two. Journal of Economics and Finance Education, 14(2):76–85.
Mueller, D. C. (2016). Gordon Tullock: Economic gadfly. Constitutional Political
Economy, 27(2):112–123.
Myles, G. D. (1995). Public Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Nitzan, S. (1991). Rent-seeking with non-identical sharing rules. Public Choice,
71(1):43–50.
Pecorino, P. (2006). Rent seeking: A textbook example. The Journal of Economic
Education, 37(3):331–339.
Podemska-Mikluch, M., Deyo, D., and Mitchell, D. T. (2016). Public choice lessons
from the wizarding world of Harry Potter. Journal of Private Enterprise, 31(1):57.
Rosen, H. and Gayer, T. (2013). Public Finance. McGraw-Hill Higher Education,
New York, 10 edition.
Rothschild, C. and Scheuer, F. (2016). Optimal taxation with rent-seeking. The
Review of Economic Studies, 83(3):1225–1262.
Salanie, B. (2011). The economics of taxation. MIT Press.
18
Sherementa, R. (2015). Behavioral dimensions of contests. In Congleton, R. and Hill-
man, A., editors, Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking, chapter 10,
pages 150–164. Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA.
Shughart, W. F. (2015). Teaching public choice at the master’s level. Journal of
Economics and Finance Education, 14(2):5–22.
Sobel, R. S. and Garrett, T. A. (2002). On the measurement of rent seeking and its
social opportunity cost. Public Choice, 112(1):115–136.
Strow, B. K. and Strow, C. W. (2006). A rent-seeking experiment for the classroom.
The Journal of Economic Education, 37(3):323–330.
Tresch, R. W. (2015). Public finance: A Normative Theory. Academic Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western
Economic Journal, 5(3):224–232.
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In Buchanan, J., Tollison, R., and Tullock,
G., editors, Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. Texas A&M University
Press, College Station.
Tullock, G. (2003). The origin rent-seeking concept. International Journal of Business
and Economics, 2(1):1–8.
Ulbrich, H. H. (2013). Public Finance in Theory and Practice. Routledge, London, 2
edition.
Wasser, C. (2013). Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests. Economic Theory,
53(1):239–268.
19
